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This article deals with European Nuclear Disarmament’s (END) difficult positioning in 
the Cold War of the 1980s. Its vision was for a humanistic socialism from below that would 
be capable of breaking up the Cold War and unite a divided Europe that in turn could 
act as a possible “third way” between the liberal capitalism of the USA and the orthodox 
Communism of the Soviet Union. However, it proved difficult to build these alliances across 
the Cold War divide without talking, at the same time, to representatives of the “official” 
peace movements of the Communist states. END found itself between the Scylla of having no 
dialogue at all with Eastern Europe or having a dialogue also with the Communist regimes 
which was seen sceptically by the dissidents. The article traces the difficulties of END of 
building humanistic socialist alliances for peace from below with special reference to END’s 
Working Group on Germany.
“[A]ct as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be 
loyal, not to ‘East’ or ‘West,’ but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions 
and limitations imposed by any national state.”1 This rallying call for European unity 
transcending the Cold War division of the continent, was part of the foundational 
appeal of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), set up by a group of academics 
and intellectuals in April 1980, with the explicit aim to link the peace agenda of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) with human rights abuses on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain.2 It quickly became a kind of intellectual wing of CND 
nicknamed “Ph.D. CND.” Its foundational manifesto called for “détente from below” 
and put its hopes for nuclear disarmament on mass mobilisation on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. The citizens rather than the statesmen of Europe would become 
the guarantors of a Cold War world in which the main competitors would no longer 
threaten each other with mutual annihilation. This would also be the beginning of 
a bloc-free Europe ranging from Britain to the western borders of the Soviet Union.
 END worked very closely with CND and many of its leading members also 
played important roles in CND. Meg Beresford, for instance, jointly held the positions 
of END’s organising secretary and general secretary of CND between 1985 and 1990. 
Another example is Dan Smith, who co-authored (with E. P. Thompson) Protest and 
Survive and (with Mary Kaldor) Disarmament Europe, two of the most important 
manifestoes of the British peace movement.3 END also provided CND with its most 
* The authors would like to thank Labour History’s two anonymous referees.
1. The Bertrand Russell Foundation, “European Nuclear Disarmament: An Appeal for Action,” 
Security Dialogue, no. 11 (1980): 108. 
2. On END generally, see the extremely informative work of Patrick D. M. Burke, “European Nuclear 
Disarmament: A Study of Transnational Social Movement Strategy” (PhD diss., University of 
Westminster, 2004); also Patrick D. M. Burke, “‘We Envisage a European-Wide Campaign in which 
Every Kind of Exchange Takes Place’: European Nuclear Disarmament in the West European 
Peace Movements of the 1980s,” in Accidental Armageddons: Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fears and the 
Cold War of the 1980s, ed. Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke and Jeremy Varon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming).
3. E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, Protest and Survive (London: Monthly Review Press, 1981); Mary 
Labour History, no. 111 (November 2016): 1–16. ISSN 0023-6942
© 2016 Australian Society for the Study of Labour History
2 Labour History • Number 111 • November 2016
important public intellectuals, such as the historian E. P. Thompson and political 
scientist Mary Kaldor. The British peace movement underwent a meteoric rise in 
the early 1980s. Its main institutional anchor was CND. By the end of the 1970s, it 
had a mere 3,000 members, whilst in 1983 it organised 100,000 members nationally 
and around half a million members in over 1,000 local branches.4 Its annual income 
rose from £461,000 in 1983 to £782,000 in 1985 by which time CND employed 40 
full-time paid members of staff.5 Its campaigns against the stationing of new Cruise 
and Pershing missiles, against NATO’s twin track approach and for unilateral 
disarmament of the West got enormous media attention in the 1980s. CND and its 
intellectual wing END was thus one of the biggest mass social movements in Cold 
War history.6 
 Within a few months, END’s Foundational Appeal had been signed by 60 
Labour MPs in the House of Commons and the famous Soviet dissident Roy 
Medvedev. END’s activities in the 1980s were aimed at building the envisioned 
Europe from below through publications, public interventions and a range of 
high-profile conventions and meetings between peace activists from both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. The key idea of such a nascent bloc-free Europe was to maintain 
equidistance between the two superpowers. The notion of equidistance had been 
popular in Eurocommunist and independent Left circles in the 1980s, and Enrico 
Berlinguer referred to it as a central strategy of overcoming the Cold War.7 END 
intellectuals tended to concur. Yet, as will be seen below, END ultimately struggled 
to keep such equidistance because it failed to draw a rigid line between itself and the 
official Communist peace movement in Eastern Europe. This discredited END in the 
eyes of many dissidents behind the Iron Curtain. However, as we will argue, END 
kept channels of communication open with Communists behind the Iron Curtain in 
the hope that this might help to bring about change in the direction of a reformed 
Communism. We will demonstrate the difficulties this entailed with specific reference 
to END’s Working Group on Germany, where many members attempted to walk a 
difficult line mediating between dissident and official Communist peace activists. 
In the West, the peace activists have often been accused of acting as a kind of fifth 
column to Moscow and of being stooges of or naïve tools of the machinations of 
Communist East European regimes. Using interviews with contemporary witnesses 
as well as material from East German archives, including the Stasi archives, this 
charge cannot be upheld. Conspiracy theories about Communist infiltration of the 
peace movement and the latter’s functionalisation in the interest of the Soviet Union 
cannot be verified.
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END and the Idea of Equidistance between the Two Superpowers
The END founding appeal had been the work of the Nottingham-based Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation, initially founded in 1963 to continue the work of Bertrand 
Russell for peace, human rights and social justice.8 In the early 1980s, it was led by 
the Nottingham academic, Ken Coates, who later became a Labour Member of the 
European Parliament (1989–99).9 Between 1982 and 1991, the Nottingham-based 
wing of END organised a convention movement that sought to bring together key 
players in the peace movements of East and West in different cities of Europe. The 
London-based wing of END, in which Thompson played a leading role, concentrated 
more on immediate contacts between East European dissidents and peace activists 
and their West European counterparts. One of the central aims was to publicise the 
opinions of East European dissident peace activists in the West.10 
 The first-ever END convention was held at the heart of the official Europe of the 
European Union, in Brussels, in 1982. It was supported by many left-wing European 
political parties and by many trade unions as well as many new social movements 
and it assembled West European peace activists from many countries. However, 
the invitations issued to dissident peace activists in Eastern Europe could not be 
taken up, as the Communist states behind the Iron Curtain did not provide them 
with passports to travel to Brussels.11 Hence, from the start, END struggled with 
the fact that their vision of a peaceful Europe from below necessitated a democratic 
civil society in which such sentiments could be freely expressed and nourished. 
The preconditions for this were only available in the capitalist West and not in the 
communist East. 
 END’s main interpretative framework of the Cold War was one of equidistance 
of Europe from the two superpowers. Both superpowers were denied the status 
of models for a European development. In the official discourse of West European 
governments during the Cold War, the USA was invariably perceived as a model 
for pluralism, democracy and “Western values” on which a close political and 
military alliance was forged. In the official discourse of East European governments, 
the USSR was equally portrayed as the motherland of the socialist revolution who 
provided a model for social, economic and political development.12 Instead, END 
sought to revive the post-World War II idea of a “third way” Europe. It was based 
on the assumption that a third way between the capitalist USA and the communist 
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USSR was possible and desirable. This third way was a democratic socialist way that 
combined the ideas of socialism, underpinning the USSR, with the idea of democracy, 
underpinning the USA. Third way socialists had argued that capitalism in the USA 
had undermined democracy and turned it into a hollow shell, manipulated by big 
business interests. Socialism in the USSR had turned into a dictatorship suppressing 
the people and not allowing them to express their will freely. In 1945 and 1946 third-
way socialists had been a prominent political force in many European countries. 
Yet the pressures of the Cold War proved too much for them. Whilst they were 
imprisoned, exiled and persecuted in the communist East, they were marginalised 
in the West, where mainstream social democracy transformed itself into a “Western” 
political force seeking no longer to transform capitalism but to humanise it.13 
 The united Europe that END imagined was a democratic socialist Europe 
following what E. P. Thompson had called “socialist humanism” after his break with 
Stalinism and the orthodoxies of Soviet communism.14 Thompson was not content 
with the reformism of Western Social Democratic Parties and sought to develop a 
“New Left” that would steer a more revolutionary course, still aiming to transform 
rather than merely to humanise capitalism. Unlike some of his “New Left” allies, 
Thompson was never content with an intellectual movement seeking to provide 
ideas and discussion for an independent Left. Thompson’s close collaboration with 
his friend Lawrence Daly, who had also broken with Communism in 1956, over 
the setting up of the Fife Socialist League, demonstrates Thompson’s desire not 
to restrict the British New Left to an intellectual movement but to build political 
and institutional alliances with the working class.15 After his attempts to help set 
up an alternative left-wing party had failed, he found in the peace movement an 
alternative platform for political action that went beyond mere theorizing. Peter 
Worsley, Dorothy Thompson and Stuart Hall remember that 
[w]ithin the new and rapidly-growing Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, what was now becoming known as the “New Left” played 
a major part. John Rex’s pamphlet “NATO or Neutralism” linked the 
neutralism which had emerged in Europe as a response to the Cold War 
to the new mass movement.16 
A neutral, bloc-free Europe was to provide the framework in which “socialist 
humanism” a la Thompson could develop. 
 END’s worldview in the 1980s portrayed the Cold War as a conflict in which 
both the USA and the USSR were hegemonic superpowers who had pushed 
through their respective interests without regard for human rights and the will of 
the people. For END, 1956 symbolised this malignant dualism perfectly. Whilst the 
Western powers Britain and France sought to push their imperial ambitions in the 
Near East, the Soviet Union crushed a democratic socialist movement in Hungary. 
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Subsequently the USA intervened against democratic socialist forces in Kenya and 
Chile, whilst the USSR again destroyed democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia 
and intervened in Afghanistan to protect its own sphere of influence. Overall then, 
according to END activists, both superpowers had time and again intervened 
against the will of the people and had committed human rights abuses in the name 
of socialism and freedom respectively.17 Thompson perceived the two blocs during 
the Cold War as “two monstrous antagonistic structures,”18 which were mutually 
constitutive. They not only impeded the realisation of his ideal type of humanist 
Marxism, they also threatened to destroy all human civilisation. The acceptance of 
the overriding concern for peace activism went alongside a ready acceptance that 
economic factors contributed to the dangers of “exterminism.” Referring to work 
by the New Left economic historian Emma Rothschild, he accepted the argument 
that the military industries in the USA after World War II were just as important as 
the textile industries during the industrial revolution in Britain. He saw the arms 
sector as dominating the economy not only in the USA, but also in the Soviet Union.19 
This economic structure, combined with a political culture of fear and irrationality, 
would be the foundation for “exterminism” and “Cold War-ism” which would 
predetermine the “historical destination.”
 The only stance for a democratic socialist Europe from below was therefore 
one of equidistance from the two superpowers. Building a peaceful Europe from 
below involved a rejection of both superpowers and the political systems that they 
represented. Yet, as the convention movement demonstrated at its start in 1982, this was 
not possible in a communist Eastern Europe as its rulers did not allow the emergence 
of a public sphere that had even a modicum of independence from the official political 
regime. Yet END’s solution to the Cold War conflict presupposed the existence of such 
a public sphere. In that sense, END’s idea of equidistance underestimated a crucial 
difference between the two systems in the Cold War – the pluralism and democracy 
of the capitalist West allowed for a freer expression of opinion than was the case in the 
socialist people’s democracies of the East. Western END activists were rudely awoken 
to this fact by the first convention in which the seats for East European delegates 
remained largely empty. How then did they react to this? 
 Outside of END, many peace activists argued that the issue of peace in Europe 
had to take precedence over the issue of supporting human rights and dissident 
behaviour in Eastern Europe. Bruce Kent, who had replaced Duncan Rees as General 
Secretary of CND in January 1980, argued, with an eye to END, that the peace 
movement should not double up as a human rights movement.20 Franco Perna, a 
member of the Quaker’s Friends World Committee, warned against the “extremists 
[who] want to rupture dialogue with the official East Bloc peace movements … in 
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Smith cited above and the journal of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in the early 1980s, all 
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favour of grassroots contacts.”21 In the political debates of the 1980s opponents of 
the peace movement in the West often charged its representatives with being crypto-
Communists or Communist fellow travellers or at the very least politically naïve 
do-gooders who were in effect doing the Communist bidding in the West.22 After 
the collapse of Communism, some scholars, using the East European archives, have 
repeated those accusations, pointing to the degree to which the Stasi had infiltrated 
the Western peace movement.23 If one followed those scholars, the answer to the 
question of why END and sections of the British peace movement engaged in 
dialogue with the Communists, would be easy – they were sharing at least parts 
of their worldview. However, things were slightly more complicated. It is true that 
Communist Party members kept CND going throughout the détente years of the 
1970s. But when CND became a mass social movement again in the early 1980s, their 
influence on the campaigns, programmes, ideas and actions of CND should not be 
overestimated. Many CND leaders (and certainly all END members) were critical 
of really-existing socialism and instead promoted a democratic socialism that was 
also often promoted by dissidents in Eastern Europe, but they did believe that the 
Communist regimes could be reformed in the direction of a democratic socialism, 
just as they believed that the liberal capitalism of the West could be transformed 
into a democratic socialist alternative.
 CND activists and leaders, including Kent, had come to the conclusion that the 
Communist governments of Eastern Europe shared some platforms with the Western 
peace movement, including a test-ban treaty, a nuclear freeze and a no-first-strike 
policy, and they were also convinced that the Soviet Union was willing to accept 
United Nations resolutions on disarmament.24 Hence Kent, as an example of other 
CND leaders, certainly valued dialogue with Eastern European Communists. In 
1983, during the END Convention in West Berlin, Kent led a delegation of peace 
activists into East Berlin to hold talks with the Friedensrat.25 His personal relations 
with Rümpel were good throughout the 1980s. With hindsight, Kent argued that the 
visit was meant as a demonstration that “not everybody in END had an implacable 
hatred towards the GDR.”26 
 Kent’s “one-world tour,” a walk from Warsaw to Brussels, that he undertook 
in 1988 to call publicly for the dissolution of both military blocs, would not have 
been possible without the perception of Eastern European Communism that Kent 
belonged to those political forces in the West sympathetic to communism.27 Indeed 
an internal Stasi report had identified Kent as early as December 1984 as being 
21. Franco Perna, Friends’ World Committee for Consultation, European and Near East Section, 
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9/649/3003, 1–2, 2, SAPMO- Bundesarchiv (hereafter SAPMO-BArch), Berlin. The Quakers 
continued their good relations with the GDR, with Horst Brasch remaining in contact with Peter 
Jayman in the mid-1980s and Quaker youth groups travelling to the GDR. See Horst Brasch, 
Bericht über den Aufenthalt einer Abordnung der LfV, DZ 9/649/3003, 1–2, 2, SAPMO-BArch.
22. Holger Nehring, “Creating Security from Below: Peace Movements in East and West Germany in 
the 1980s,” in The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism, ed. 
Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 136–53.
23. Anthony Glees, The Stasi Files: East Germany’s Secret Operations against Britain (London: Free Press, 2004).
24. Bruce Kent, interview with authors, 11 July 2002. On Kent’s tactic of lobbying the United Nations, 
see Kent, Undiscovered Ends, 175–76.
25. The group comprised Jane Mayes, D Smith and Stephen Brown, see CND-Delegation in die DDR, 
file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
26. Kent, interview.
27. Ibid. This is confirmed by the documentation in file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive. 
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among those forces in CND close to the positions of East European Communism.28 In 
unpublished talks with the Friedensrat of May 1983 Kent had criticised the position 
of END, especially END’s insistence on linking the issue of peace with the issue of 
human rights.29 The East German media published articles quoting Kent praising his 
warm reception and the regime’s commitment to “peace.”30 In Britain, Kent praised 
the GDR in the Guardian for converting a SS-22 missile base into a holiday home. 
He also compared the GDR favourably with the capitalist FRG.31 Representatives 
of the Friedensrat, visiting Britain in September 1986, felt confident about being 
understood by CND: “In all our meetings we could demonstrably see the growing 
recognition of the GDR due to its active policy of dialogue in the interest of peace, 
disarmament and détente.”32 Kent had certainly not forced upon them the idea that 
he was hostile to the Communist states in Eastern Europe.
 In fact, several regional CND delegations travelled to East Berlin during the 1980s 
to visit the Friedensrat and hold talks with them about the “common aim” – peace 
in Europe.33 In 1987, a CND report praised the SED for allegedly pursuing a reform 
socialist agenda: “Glasnost with a German Face.” The authors of the report were 
particularly hopeful that the Communists in East Berlin had given up on spreading 
communism in the world and were genuinely willing to enter into dialogue with 
capitalist countries.34 And a leading member of Labour Action for Peace (LAP), 
an organisation close to both the Labour Party and CND, Ernie Ross admired the 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe for their achievements, including granting 
everyone the right to study and work, while in his constituency at home, 20 per cent 
of the working people only had the “freedom” to be unemployed. William McKelvey, 
also of LAP, countered allegations of censorship in the GDR with insinuations that 
the British media coverage of the brutal use of the police in the miners’ strike was 
itself highly restricted and selective.35 Statements such as these made the British 
peace movement vulnerable to charges of pro-Sovietism, even of being in the pay 
of the Soviets with rumours of “Moscow gold” being discussed among those critical 
of Kent and his leadership of CND. They made it easy for the British government 
who started a campaign of disinformation, centring on the issue of Communist 
infiltration, in order to weaken CND.36 
 But CND as a whole was not a tool in the hand of Communism. Communists 
made up only 0.3 per cent of CND’s members in 1985, and only one per cent favoured 
Communist candidates at elections for CND offices. In 1981 Joan Ruddock, a Labour 
Party supporter, soundly defeated its Communist rival for the chair of CND, and 
28. Hausmitteilung Feist an Axen, 3 December 1984, 316, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
29. Gespräche Kent mit Friedensrat, Mai 1983, 145, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
30. Günter Bräuer, Bereich Arbeit in der DDR, Information über Bruce Kents Marsch “One World 
Walk,” 10 August 1988, 189, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive. 
31. Bruce Kent, “Into the Security-Conscious Frontline,” Guardian, 1 August 1988; Bruce Kent, 
“Reflections in the Distorting Mirror of Propaganda,” Guardian, 8 August 1988.
32. Schultz, Aufenthalt einer Delegation des Friedensrats in Groβbritannien, September 1986, 365, file 
854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
33. Information über den Aufenthalt der Delegation der Londoner Regionalgruppe der Kampagne 
für Nukleare Abrüstung, London Region CND, Groβbritannien, vom 13–18 December 1988, 6 
February 1989, 2–5, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
34. CND-Delegation in die DDR, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
35. Delegation Labour Action for Peace, February 1987, 214–24, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive; 
Information über das Gespräch mit der Delegation der Labour Action for Peace am 12 Oktober 
1984 im Berliner Rathaus, 15 October 1984, 2, file 246, series C Rep 122, Landesarchiv Berlin.
36. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, 276.
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in 1985 the Communist candidate, Vic Allen, came a distant last in a field of five 
candidates for the chair.37 With the objective of preserving the peace movement’s 
unity, Kent tried to balance the pro- and anti-Soviet forces in CND and END by 
criticising aspects of Soviet policy, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
deployment of SS-20 missiles in central Europe, while praising others. He also 
supported conscientious objectors behind the Iron Curtain. Yet this was not what 
got media attention in Britain, where CND’s hostility to American military bases in 
Britain and the “modernisation” of the country’s “nuclear deterrent” were far more 
likely to catch the headlines. As Stasi reports on Kent make clear, this was also what 
made him persona grata in East Berlin.38 
 END, with its much more outspoken hostility to really-existing socialism behind 
the Iron Curtain, reacted to criticisms by Kent and others in CND by coming up with 
a compromise: dissident peace activists would remain involved in the organisation 
of future conventions and contact with these dissidents was to be maintained but 
END would now also talk to the official Communist peace movements in order 
to promote in dialogue their own views on building a peaceful Europe. Delegates 
from official Communist peace movements would also be invited to the planned 
conventions as “guests.”39
 Communist officials were happy enough with this suggestion, as it gave them 
a platform in the West on which to promote the socialist states as “peace states” 
opposing the stationing of new American missiles in Europe. But the dissidents in 
Eastern Europe were not prepared to play game. At the 1984 END convention in 
Perugia, those who had been allowed to attend by the Communist regimes, used the 
opportunity to remind their Western friends that they were talking to representatives 
of dictatorships who were silencing and imprisoning dissidents and violating human 
rights on a massive scale.40 
 END activists were divided on how to react to the demands of East European 
dissidents to cut all relations with official Communist peace movements. The 
Nottingham-based Bertrand Russell Foundation whose appeal initiated END in 
April 1980 had a difficult relationship with the East European communism. Bertrand 
Russell himself had accepted the GDR’s Carl von Ossietzky Prize only to return it 
in protest over the imprisonment of Social Democrat Heinz Brandt in 1962. In the 
1980s, the Foundation had close contacts to key GDR dissidents, including Robert 
Havemann and Rainer Eppelmann and kept its distance to official Communist 
circles.41 The London-based END group had formed five “lateral groups” that 
had been developing contacts with dissident groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR. Three of those groups, the ones dealing 
with Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak dissidents, decided to refuse all contacts with 
official Communists, whilst the Hungarian and GDR groups felt that it was beneficial 
37. Ibid., 137.
38. This is made explicit in the Stasi files on the British peace movement, see, for example, Information 
über das Gespräch zwischen Vertretern des Friedensrates der DDR und Msg. Bruce Kent am 13 
May 1983 im Friedensrat, 413–15, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
39. Gerhard Jordan, “European Nuclear Disarmament: Der ‚END-Prozeß‘ und sein Beitrag zum Ost-
West-Dialog der unabhängigen Friedensbewegungen Europas in den 80er-Jahren” (Diploma thesis, 
University of Vienna, 1997).
40. Jane Mayes [1984], International Committee, 1982–84, 1/5, CND Additions, LSE Archive.
41. Letter from Ken Coates to the authors, 2 May 2003.
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to retain contacts also with the official Communist peace movement.42 In the Soviet, 
Polish and Czechoslovak groups many activists were exiled Russians, Poles and 
Czechoslovaks which might explain why they were more adamant only to maintain 
contacts with fellow dissidents behind the Iron Curtain and to uphold the strong link 
between peace and human rights that was behind the foundational appeal of END. 
Many dissidents behind the Iron Curtain had come to the conclusion that human 
rights needed to be prioritised over the state-sponsored peace rhetoric and this 
decision put them on a collision course with their Communist governments. Insofar 
as the Western groups shared this outlook, any cooperation with representatives 
of the official regimes in Eastern Europe was out of the question.43 In what follows, 
we use the example of the GDR working group to demonstrate the difficulties of 
maintaining the compromise position that END as a whole had arrived at in order 
to maintain the convention movement after 1982.
The Working Group on Germany and its Difficulties with the Doctrine of Equidistance
The London-based END working group on Germany consisted mainly of British 
academics with a scholarly interest in the GDR. Prominent amongst them were John 
Sandford, Barbara Einhorn, Peter Findlay, John Theobald and Gwyneth Edwards. It 
also included the Canon of Coventry Cathedral, Paul Oestreicher. Its active core never 
comprised more than 12 members and its mailing list had a total of 50 addresses, 
but through its high-profile actions and its publications in the press of the peace 
movement and in other media it got a lot of public attention in the British peace 
movement. In February 1982, it held a first meeting at Bedford College in London to 
assemble those who had a special interest in the two Germanies and in promoting 
peace in Europe. Many of those attending would have agreed with Ian Wallace’s 
statement that their scholarly interest in the GDR was also a way of promoting peace 
because they were providing the basis for a better understanding of Communist East 
Germany and thereby countering many of the Cold War images of the East that were 
prevalent in the West.44 The group had strong contacts with the Green Party in West 
Germany, notably the peace activist Petra Kelly. Kelly shared a strong commitment 
to human rights with an equally strong commitment to peace and disarmament, 
which brought her position close to those of the East German dissidents and to END.45 
But it had also forged links to dissidents in East Germany, notably the authors of 
an appeal for disarmament in the East, Robert Havemann and Rainer Eppelmann. 
In their manifesto from January 1982, circulating clandestinely in East Germany, 
they had identified with the END appeal to build a peaceful Europe from below 
and had argued that the removal of all foreign troops from German soil would be 
an important first step in this direction.46 The END working group on Germany 
42. Operative Auskunft zur britischen Organisation, European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 
END, [December 1985], 208–14, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
43. Kacper Szulecki, “Hijacked Ideas: Human Rights, Peace and Environmentalism in Czechoslovak 
and Polish Dissident Discourses,” East European Politics and Society 25, no. 2 (2011): 272–95.
44. Hans-Georg Golz, “Von East Germany zur DDR. DDR-Forschung in Grossbritannien vor 1990,” 
Deutschland Archiv 36, no. 1 (2003): 22f. 
45. Saskia Richter, Die Aktivistin: das Leben der Petra Kelly (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010).
46. Sandford, email interview with the authors, November 2004; Kelly was a co-initiator of the 
Bertrand Russell Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Europe and of the Krefelder Appell against the 
stationing of Pershing II missiles in Europe. The Krefeld Forums were among the most prominent 
peace forums in Germany during the early 1980s. On GDR studies see also Ian Wallace “GDR 
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decided to publish this manifesto in an English translation in Britain and raised the 
money for a quarter-page advert in The Times, in which many leading politicians 
and intellectuals expressed their solidarity with the dissident GDR appeal. Among 
the signatories were Tony Benn, Robin Cook, Neil Kinnock, Ken Loach and Salman 
Rushdie. END had circulated a translation of the GDR manifesto under the joint 
headings of END and “Swords into Ploughshares,” the slogan of the dissident peace 
movement in the GDR. They hoped that the publication in Britain would give not 
only greater attention to the dissidents but also greater protection of its members 
from state harassment and persecution.47
 The strong contacts of the END Working Group on Germany with dissidents 
in the GDR produced harsh reactions by the GDR authorities. In December 1983, 
Barbara Einhorn, a University of Sussex-based academic and the daughter of German 
Communists, who fled Nazi Germany and made a living in New Zealand, travelled 
to the GDR to meet with dissident women activists of the peace movement, a group 
called “Women for Peace.” Tipped off by a Stasi informant in Britain, East German 
authorities arrested her at the border when she was trying to leave the country. 
The dissident material she was trying to smuggle out of East Berlin and which was 
to be the basis of an article Einhorn was planning to write in the West to publicise 
the activities of “Women for Peace,” was confiscated. Interrogated at the famous 
Stasi prison in Berlin-Schönhausen, she was soon released and sent back to Britain 
following a strong lobbying campaign by END. However, the GDR put an entry 
ban on her and imprisoned key representatives of “Women for Peace,” including 
Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe.48 It was a clear sign that Communists in Eastern 
Europe had little sympathy for building a democratic socialist Europe from below.
 There is plenty of evidence of the GDR authorities seeing END’s concern with 
human rights as an unwanted intervention in their internal affairs and combating 
it wherever possible. As the dissidents in the GDR were increasingly linking the 
issue of peace with the issue of human rights,49 the authorities in the GDR were 
particularly keen to avoid any such association. The END activist John Sandford 
was also faced with an entry ban to the GDR, following the publication of his END 
report on the GDR peace movement, entitled The Sword and the Ploughshare. In it, he 
provided an insightful account of how diverse peace groups found limited protection 
under the umbrella of the Protestant church in the GDR, criticised the heavy hand 
of the Communist state in its dealings with the dissidents, and denounced the 
official peace movement as an instrument of crude propaganda for the ruling 
Communist party. CND’s International Committee tried to challenge those entry 
bans on several occasions by putting both Einhorn and Sandford on lists of CND 
delegates to meetings in the GDR. However GDR authorities made it very clear 
that, rather than accepting “unwanted” delegates into the country, they preferred 
Studies in Great Britain,” East Central Europe 14/15 (1987/88): 17–30; John Theobald, “Cutting the 
Barbed Wire of Prejudice,” Journal of Area Studies 9 (1984): 7–10.
47. Sandford, “Mutual (Mis-)Perceptions,” 362–64.
48. Paul Oestreicher, interview with authors, 15 August 2000. From a perspective highly critical of 
Einhorn and END, see Glees, Stasi Files, 323f. Einhorn’s and Sandford’s ripostes to Glees can be 
found in “From a GDR Prison to a Cold War of Words,” Times Higher Education Supplement, 6 
January 2006, and “Scholar Bites Back at Stasi Innuendo,” Times Higher Education Supplement, 4 
November 2006. The events surrounding Einhorn’s arrest are summarised in an untitled Stasi 
document, 261–64, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
49. Thomas Klein, Frieden und Gerechtitkeit’: Die Politisierung der Unabhängigen Friedensbewegung in 
Ostberlin während der 1980er Jahre (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).
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those CND meetings not to proceed.50 The GDR could not tolerate any independent 
public sphere challenging the authority of the ruling Communist party and hence it 
could not accept the basis on which END was proposing to build a peaceful Europe.
 Instead the Stasi had identified END as major enemy in the Cold War. When it was 
talking about the “growing pressure of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet forces [that] 
have weakened the anti-imperialist strategy” of CND, they were referring to END.51 
The Stasi believed that END was financially supported by the American government 
and that it operated in conjunction with the British secret service to strengthen “anti-
socialist forces in the GDR.”52 Its strategy to combat END involved the use of CND 
activists more favourably inclined to disinvesting the issue of peace from the issue 
of human rights.53 Furthermore, it also used informers inside END to update them 
on the latest plans and activities. In addition to reports on END by Irene Fick, the 
Stasi also received inside formation from Vic Alan and the Loughborough-based 
academic Gwyneth Edwards, who was a member of the GDR Working Group.54 
 In fact, representatives of the official East German peace movement, the 
Friedensrat, were keen to develop contacts with Western peace movements including 
the British one, if it would mean finding a platform in the West on which to promote 
their viewpoints on peace. A leading member of the Friedensrat, Werner Rümpel 
met with leading representatives of CND, including Bruce Kent, Joan Ruddock and 
Meg Beresford both at the East German embassy and at CND’s national offices in 
London during 1981 and 1982.55 Both sides could agree that the USA was the main 
culprit in accelerating the arms race. According to Rümpel, this should also be the 
basis for common action of the British and East German peace movements: “[F]
or all our different points of view we are close allies in the main task of our time 
which is to prevent a nuclear world conflagration.”56 Official GDR representatives 
supported CND action, wherever it was directed against American missiles. Thus, 
for example, Günther Drehfahl, the President of the Friedensrat, sent a telegram 
expressing his “close solidarity” with the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp 
in 1982, and one year later the GDR awarded the women’s peace camp the Carl von 
Ossietzky peace medal.57 The GDR’s Deutscher Frauenbund (DFB) wooed groups 
such as Mothers for Peace and the International League for Peace and Freedom in 
Britain – always with the assumption that their struggle was a common one against 
potential American aggression.58 
50. Operative Auskunft zur britischen Organisation END, 214.
51. Information: Aktivitäten der britischen “Kampagne für nukleare Abrüstung, Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, CND, im Sinne der blockübergreifenden Friedensbewegung [1985], 6f, file 
18570, series HA II, Stasi Archive.
52. Einschätzung des tschecheslowakischen Geheimdienstes zur britischen Friedensbewegung und 
Entwurf eines Berichtes zu CND, 121, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
53. File 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
54. Their reports to the Stasi are contained in files AKG II and 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive. Also 
see, Glees, Stasi Files, 268–69.
55. See the reports in file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
56. Letter from Werner Rümpel to Bruce Kent, 24 November 1982, DZ 9/150/A 746, SAPMO-BArch.
57. Letter from Günter Drefahl to Dear Friends [Greenham Common], 1 December 1982, DZ 9/150/A 
746, SAPMO-BArch; Letter from Günter Drefahl to Bruce Kent, 24 August 1981, DZ 9/406/2179, 
SAPMO-BArch.
58. Protokoll Nr. 9/1987 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des Bundesvorstandes des DFD vom 26 May 
1987, 130–31, DY 31/484, SAPMO-BArch; Bundesvorstand des DFD, Sekretariat. Einschätzung der 
internationalen Arbeit des Bundesvorstandes und der Bezirksvorstände des DFD im Jahre 1987, 
39–54, DY 31/484, SAPMO-BArch. The DFB had haphazard and intermittent contact with a variety 
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 Despite the hostility of the GDR towards END, END activists, and in particular 
the END Working Group on Germany, tried to maintain contacts with the GDR’s 
official peace movement. As Paul Oestreicher recalls: 
Even though we were very critical of the GDR and were suspected there, 
we still had an enormous amount of emotional attachment to it … We all 
had friends in Eastern Germany who dreamed of, I suppose, socialism 
with a human face.59
The assumptions that many END activists had about the importance of equidistance 
in the Cold War led them to acknowledge that really-existing socialism had at least 
attempted to create socialist societies. However mistaken, especially in their rejection 
of democracy, they had been in building socialism, the emotional attachment that 
Oestreicher talks about also comes from the feeling that these societies had taken 
steps in the right direction. 
 In the perception of members of the END Working Group on Germany, there 
was a real possibility of dialogue between the Communist state and the dissident 
peace groups. Sandford perceived the role of the Protestant church in the GDR as 
precisely being such a mediator for more dialogue. On both sides, he saw those who 
were willing to enter into a productive engagement with each other:
What has been increasingly evident over the past year or so is that the 
authorities have been concerned to embrace grass-roots initiatives as 
far as possible, and to avoid criminalising them. The concern of the 
autonomous peace movement has been steadily but firmly to widen 
that embrace, to keep open and expand the space for dialogue and the 
breadth of argument.60 
From what the archives tell us, we can say with hindsight that these were very rose-
tinted spectacles that END members were wearing. A large part of the explanation 
of why they were wearing them has to do with the particular worldview that we 
describe here as the belief in the equidistance from the two superpowers and the 
ideal of a “third way” democratic-socialist Europe from below.
 Interestingly this belief was reinforced by the dissident milieu in the GDR in 
which belief in a democratic socialism mingled with notions of equidistance from 
the two superpowers. The dissident worldview thus coincided with the worldview 
of END activists and arguably they mutually strengthened each other. This also 
explains why peace activists in Britain, thinking mistakenly that they could act as 
mediators, much as they believed the Protestant church did in the GDR, repeatedly 
called on official GDR representatives to open a dialogue with the dissidents. Thus, 
for example, CND activist, Stephen Brown, who had been a theology exchange 
student at Humboldt University in 1983–84,61 asked Rümpel, as the head of an official 
delegation of the Friedensrat, at a meeting between the Friedensrat and CND in 
59. Oestreicher, interview.
60. John Sandford, Sword and the Ploughshare: Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany (London: 
Merlin Press, 1983), 77.
61. There he had extensive contacts with dissident peace activists, under the watchful eye of the Stasi. 
See Information zur Durchdringung der britischen Kampagne für Nukleare Abrüstung (CND) von 
Führungskräften der END, 25 November 1985, 216, file 854, series HA XX, Stasi Archive.
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London in October 1985, to open up channels of communication with dissident peace 
activists in the GDR through the offices of the Association of Protestant Churches in 
the GDR.62 It was one way of underlining that the British peace movement would 
not accept the Friedensrat as the sole legitimate representative of the GDR peace 
movement. But it was also one way of demonstrating that Western peace activists 
had not given up hope that ruling Communists behind the Iron Curtain could be 
brought to recognise and buy into the human rights discourse that had underpinned 
the Helsinki process from the mid-1970s. After all, “respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” had been written into the Helsinki Accord of 1975.63
 Those forces in END, like the Working Group on Germany, who attempted to 
keep channels of communication open with the official Communist peace movement, 
in the hope that it might also help the dissident peace movement, walked a delicate 
line. They embarked on it, because they believed that “really-existing socialism” in 
the GDR could be reformed and they hoped that moderate Communists in the SED 
might form a link to the dissidents and embark on such a reform course. However, 
time and time again, they were disappointed by the official Communist reaction to 
dissident protests. In January 1988, the Stasi arrested members of the autonomous 
peace group, “Initiative for Peace and Human Rights,” Bärbel Bohley, Werner Fischer 
and Vera Wollenberger, who had been protesting at the annual Liebknecht-Luxemburg 
celebrations in East Berlin. They carried banners with quotations from Luxemburg 
such as “Freedom is always the freedom of those who have a different opinion.” They 
were charged with protesting with “independent slogans” and deported to the West.64 
END activist Paul Oestreicher intervened and offered them a six-months stay in Britain 
as official guests of the Archbishop of Canterbury. During this period, the friendship 
between END members of the Working Group on Germany and the GDR dissidents 
deepened. Their discussions were always monitored by the Stasi, as the husband of 
Vera Wollenberger had been successfully recruited to report on the group.65 
 The Stasi also used recruits from within the peace movement to keep a close 
watch on developments in CND’s National Council. Vic Allen, a professor from 
Leeds University, passed on information regularly to the East German embassy. 
So, for example, he warned them about plans to hold a protest meeting against the 
visit of Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, to Britain in March 1985. Allen 
also recommended that “the Peace Councils of the socialist states must continue 
discussions with regional divisions of CND” where pro-Soviet feeling was allegedly 
stronger.66 Finally, he spent a great deal of time reporting about END, in particular 
their “unambiguous orientation towards strengthening contacts with the so-called 
independent peace movement in the socialist countries.”67 
62. Operative Auskunft zur britischen Organisation END, 209. 
63. “Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 
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Conclusion
END activists were under no illusion about being watched by the Stasi. They were 
aware of the dark sides of really-existing socialism behind the Iron Curtain which 
is why they attempted to link the issue of peace with the issue of human rights. Yet 
they also were convinced of the dark sides of liberal capitalism that in many countries 
of the world was endorsing and even encouraging human rights abuses. Hence 
the original idea behind END was to forge an alliance of those on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain who shared democratic socialist convictions that could transform both 
liberal capitalism and really-existing socialism. Many Eastern European dissidents 
did indeed share this worldview, but they were faced with political regimes that, 
unlike their liberal capitalist adversaries, did not allow any form of independent civil 
society to emerge.68 The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe consequently had no 
interest in promoting a dialogue involving those critical of their regimes. They had 
the power and the will to prevent dissidents from taking up the offer of a dialogue. 
 What the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were, however, interested in 
was the promotion of their own “peace policies” in the West and the prevention of 
the planned stationing of American missiles in Western Europe.69 Therefore, they did 
cultivate links with Western peace movements, including the British CND. Many 
CND activists were also willing to perceive the Communist states of Eastern Europe 
as genuine allies in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. There were those who 
argued that their joint efforts should focus on the issue of peace and not overburden 
the common struggle with the issue of human rights. That left END activists with 
a difficult choice. If they insisted on the link to human rights, they would have to 
avoid all contact with official Communist peace activists. They would invariably be 
banned from Eastern Europe and could at best only develop clandestine relations 
with dissidents behind the Iron Curtain. As we have seen, there were END working 
groups who went down this road. But there were also those in END who opted 
for what they saw as a compromise – maintaining relations with both the official 
Communist peace movement and the dissidents.
 One of the most prominent groups to undertake such a tightrope walk was the 
END Working Group on Germany. The basis of their willingness to compromise was 
the firm belief that the GDR could be reformed. They thought they had identified 
those in the system who were willing to bring the GDR towards a “socialism with 
a human face.” Hence they also understood their own role as one of mediating 
between the Communists and the dissidents. In their perception, they were doing 
what the Protestant church in the GDR was also doing: promoting dialogue between 
the dissidents and the representatives of the Communist state. They were, however, 
time and again, disappointed in the reactions of the Communist state. The banning 
of END activists from entering the GDR, the imprisonment and enforced exile of 
dissidents with close contacts to END activists, the constant monitoring of END by 
the Stasi – all of this underlines the hard-line positioning of the Communist state 
vis-à-vis everyone who had even the slightest criticism of that state. If there was, 
68. On the ongoing problems caused by this weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe, see Marc 
Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).
69. Günter Wernicke, “The Communist-Led World Peace Council and Western Peace Movements,” 
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during the 1980s, a reform faction in the SED and inside the Communist apparatus 
of functionaries, and much points to the existence of such a faction, it was far too 
weak and perhaps also far too fearful to make a real difference in the GDR. With 
hindsight, one might therefore charge the END activists with political naivety. Yet 
their basic idea of developing concepts that would transcend both really-existing 
socialism and liberal capitalism, was at the very least a courageous one. As really-
existing socialism is a thing of the past, the only thing that stands between a shallow 
triumphalism of liberal capitalism and cynicism is the idea that the unmistakeable 
shortcomings of liberal capitalism can also be transcended.
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